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Faced with the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, many nations have mandated sets of 
requirements, such as social-distancing measures. However, compliance with such measures 
is likely to be shaped by a range of factors. Here, we proposed and tested a mediation model 
in which rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories and/or theorists mediates the 
relationship between rational thinking style and compliance with mandated requirements. An 
online, nationally representative sample of the adult population in the United Kingdom (N = 
520) completed a previously-validated measure of rational thinking style, as well as novel 
measures of rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists and compliance with 
mandated requirements. Inter-correlations between scores on all three measures were 
significant and positive. Mediation analysis indicated that rational thinking style and rejection 
of COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists, respectively, were directly associated with 
compliance, and that the mediated association was also significant. These results may have 
implications for practical policy aimed at promoting greater compliance with mandated 
requirements, including social distancing. 





 The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic presents a serious threat to physical and 
mental well-being worldwide. In response to the crisis, many governments have mandated a 
range of requirements, such as mask-wearing and social-distancing. In 2020, for instance, the 
United Kingdom government shifted from a delay phase to a contain phase, which included a 
number of mandated social-distancing requirements (e.g., only leaving the home for food, 
health reasons, and work if individuals are unable to work from home; Cabinet Office, 2020). 
While the effectiveness of these measures and their impact on mental well-being continues to 
be discussed (e.g., Qiu et al., 2020; Torales et al., 2020), the available evidence from both the 
United Kingdom (Atchinson et al., 2020) and elsewhere (e.g., Pedersen & Favero, 2020; 
Zhang et al., 2020) indicates that individual ability and willingness to comply with social-
distancing measures are associated with a range of economic, socio-political, demographic, 
and psychological factors.  
 One potentially important psychological factor that may affect decisions to comply 
with mandated requirements is belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19. Conspiracy 
theories about COVID-19 – such as claims that it is caused by electromagnetic waves 
transmitted by 5G telephone masts or that governments are intentionally causing panic in 
order to introduce draconian population-control measures – have spread quickly since the 
pandemic began (Depoux et al., 2020; Kouzy et al., 2020), with about one in five respondents 
in the United States and United Kingdom believing in such theories (Geldsetzer, 2020). In 
turn, such beliefs may lead people to resort to potentially harmful remedies, to dismiss 
official guidance to prevent the spread of COVID-19, or to deliberately engage in risky 
behaviour that spreads the virus (Pennycook et al., 2020). For example, it is conceivable that 
individuals who believe that COVID-19 is caused not by a virus but rather by 
electromagnetic waves may take fewer precautions to comply with social-distancing and 
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instead engage in action aimed at the perceived source of the threat (e.g., by setting fire to 5G 
telephone masts and thus endangering not just national infrastructure but also the lives of 
others; Waterson & Hern, 2020).  
Consistent with these arguments, some studies have reported a significant association 
between stronger belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and reduced compliance with 
mandated requirements (e.g., Bierwiaczonek et al., 2020; Fazio et al., 2021; Freeman et al., 
2021; Rieger, 2020; but see Alper et al., 2021) and lower intention to reduce the spread of 
COVID-19 (Biddletone et al., 2020). These findings are consistent with a large body of pre-
pandemic research on the psychology of conspiracy theories (for reviews, see Douglas et al., 
2017; Goreis & Voracek, 2019; Swami & Furnham, 2014), which has highlighted the link 
between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of negative health behaviours and 
intentions. For instance, stronger belief in conspiracy theories about influenza vaccinations 
(e.g., that it is a way to experiment on people without their knowledge) has been associated 
with less favourable attitudes toward the vaccine (Quinn et al., 2017) and lower intention to 
vaccinate (e.g., Hidiroglu et al., 2010; Lohiniva et al., 2014; Setbon & Raude, 2010). 
While it is likely that belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories shaped attitudes and 
behaviours vis-à-vis mandated requirements, the available evidence also suggests that 
reducing the appeal of conspiracy theories can be very difficult, particularly among deeply 
convicted believers (e.g., Berinsky, 2017; Carey et al., 2020). Thus, rather than focusing on 
belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, there may be greater value in focusing on those who 
do not believe in such conspiracy theories. Doing so may be practically useful, given that 
agent-based modelling has suggested that “immunising” a fifth of a population from 
spreading conspiracy-framed narratives could mitigate against the negative effects of such 
misinformation during contagious disease outbreaks (Brainard & Hunter, 2019). Of course, 
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merely “not believing” in conspiracy theories may be insufficient, especially as it is possible 
that non-believers may become believers under certain circumstances (Douglas, 2021). 
Instead, there may be value in adopting an alternative approach that supports 
individuals to critically evaluate the claims of conspiracy theorists, recognise and refute 
unsubstantiated claims, and ultimately adopt a stance of active rejection of conspiracy 
theories and the people who espouse them. Although we are not aware of any prior research 
that has focused on rejection of (as opposed to belief in) conspiracy theories, we suggest that 
such a framework may be particularly useful in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
this instance, misinformation and conspiracy theorising about the pandemic has the potential 
to directly and negatively affect one’s self-interests, as well as the interests of one’s in-groups 
(e.g., by increasing the risk of infection). In such a scenario, it is possible to that some 
individuals will develop and adopt a more critical attitudinal stance towards conspiracist 
beliefs, develop heightened affective responses (e.g., anger, disgust) toward conspiracy 
theorists, and support acts designed to reduce the spread of conspiracy theories or punish 
conspiracy theorists.  
Of course, we do not suggest that all “non-believers” will adopt such a stance of 
active rejectionism. Nevertheless, measuring one’s rejection of conspiracy theories may 
provide hitherto novel insights that will allow practitioners and policy-makers to more 
effectively ensure compliance with mandated requirements. In this sense, it is possible that 
active rejection of conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists will be associated with greater 
individual compliance with mandated requirements as a safeguard against perceived risk-
taking by others, particularly those who are perceived as conspiracy theorists (and who may 
be perceived as taking fewer precautions themselves). Certainly, this is a novel proposition, 
but there is some evidence that exposing individuals to rational counter-arguments (Swami et 
al., 2013) – that is, providing individuals with valid reasons to reject conspiracy theorists – 
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and ridiculing conspiracy theories (Orosz et al., 2016) are effective at reducing belief in 
conspiracy theories.  
However, adopting a stance of active rejection is also likely to be cognitively 
effortful: such a stance requires an elaboration of one’s own ideological commitment, a 
consideration of evidence that allows for a rejection of misinformation, and possibly a 
rehearsal of counter-arguments. Such effortful cognition reflects what is sometimes called the 
System 2 process or rational thinking style (sometimes also called analytic or reflective 
thinking style) within dual-process theory (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Rational thinking is deliberative, cognitively-demanding, and slow, and can be 
contrasted with System 1 processes or intuitive thinking, which are autonomous and fast. 
Recent research has suggested that individual differences in these thinking styles are 
associated with a range of beliefs (for a review, see Pennycook et al., 2015a), with greater 
rational/analytic thinking in particular being associated with significantly lower belief in 
conspiracy theories (Barron et al., 2018; Swami et al., 2014; van Prooijen, 2017), including 
COVID-19 conspiracy theories (Čavojová et al., 2021). Drawing on and extending these 
findings, we suggest here that greater rational thinking style may provide the necessary basis 
for adopting a stance of active rejection of conspiracy theories and a negative view of people 
who espouse conspiracy theories.  
Aside from indirectly affecting compliance with social-distancing measures via 
rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, there is also a possibility that rational thinking 
style exerts a direct influence. This supposition is based on expectancy-value approaches 
(e.g., Azjen, 1991, 1999), which suggests that health actions are the result of decision-making 
processes and reasoning geared toward goal attainment. For example, it is possible that the 
contemplation and premeditation that are hallmarks of rational thinking style focus attention 
on the risks of health (in)action, the relative costs and benefits of health-related behaviours, 
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and the short- and long-consequences of health (in)action (Gerrard et al., 2008; Loewenstein 
et al., 2001). Such reasoning processes, in turn, are expected to facilitate decision-making 
that promotes positive health behaviours both for the self and for one’s community, which 
here could involve the decision to comply with mandated requirements. Indeed, there is some 
emerging evidence to suggest that analytic thinking is positively associated with compliance 
with social-distancing measures and hand-washing (Stanley et al., 2021; Teovanović et al., 
2021). Additionally, individuals who prefer a rational thinking style may also have a greater 
sense of familiarity with scientific-medical consensus, which similarly increases compliance 
with social-distancing measures (see Plohl & Musil, 2020).  
1.1. The Present Study 
 Here, we suggest that there is value examining the extent to which both rejection of 
COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists and rational thinking style are related to compliance 
with mandated requirements to stop the spread of COVID-19. As such, we examined 
associations between these constructs in a sample of United Kingdom adults, recruited just 
over two weeks after the United Kingdom government announced a nationwide lockdown 
and mandated social-distancing measures in 2020. Specifically, we tested a mediation model 
in which, first, rational thinking style is significantly and directly associated with greater 
compliance with mandated requirements. Second, we also expected that rational thinking 
style would be significantly associated with greater rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy 
theories/theorists and, in turn, that rejection of such conspiracy theories/theorists would be 
significantly associated with greater compliance. A graphical depiction of our hypothesised 





 The participants of this study consisted of an online, nationally representative sample 
of adults from the United Kingdom (N = 520). Of the sample, 264 identified as women, 253 
as men, and 3 as other, and the total sample ranged in age from 18 to 76 years (M = 45.85, SD 
= 15.26). The majority of participants were British White (81.0%), while 8.5% were 
Asian/British Asian, 4.8% were Black/Black British, 3.8% were of mixed race, and 1.9% 
were of other ancestry. In terms of educational qualifications, 21.2% had completed their 
General Certificates of Secondary Education (GCSEs), 21.3% had an Advanced-Level (A-
Level) qualification, 34.2% had an undergraduate degree, 18.1% had a postgraduate degree, 
1.3% were still in full-time education, and 3.8% had some other qualification. In total, 12.1% 
self-reported that they were living on their own, 30.0% with a partner, 31.2% with a partner 
and children, 20.4% with their families, 3.8% with friends or housemates, and 2.5% in some 
other living arrangement. The majority of participants had not been tested and diagnosed with 
COVID-19 (97.3%) and the majority also did not know anyone who had been tested and 
diagnosed (73.1%).  
2.2. Materials 
 2.2.1. Rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories. To assess rejection of COVID-
19 conspiracy theories and critical attitudes toward COVID-19 conspiracy theorists, we 
designed a novel scale based on best-practice recommendations (Spector, 1992). Specifically, 
the first author initially defined and refined the constructs of interest through a reading of the 
available literature, before developing an initial 22-item pool. This item pool was then 
discussed between authors and consensually refined by rewording items to improve clarity 
and removing conceptually and semantically redundant items. The final item pool consisted 
of 18 items (see Table 1), which tap attitudinal and affective dispositions toward COVID-19 
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conspiracy theories and those who spread such theories, the negative consequences of such 
conspiracy theories, and support for efforts to minimise exposure to such conspiracy theories. 
All items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). We report on the factorial structure and internal consistency of this novel measure in 
the Results. 
 2.2.2. Rational thinking style. Participants were asked to complete the 12-item 
Rational Thinking Style subscale of the Rational/Experiential Multimodal Inventory (REIm; 
Norris & Epstein, 2011). This subscale assesses individual differences in the tendency to 
solve problems through understanding of logical principles and the evaluation of evidence 
(sample item: “I enjoy problems that require hard thinking”). An overall score was computed 
as the mean of all 12 items, with higher scores reflecting a stronger rational thinking style. 
Scores on the REIm subscales have been shown to have adequate construct validity and 
internal consistency coefficients (Norris & Epstein, 2011). In the present study, ω for scores 
on this subscale was .93 (95% CI = .92, .94). 
 2.2.3. Compliance with mandated requirements. We asked participants to self-
report their compliance to four activities adapted from the Cabinet Office’s (2020) list of 
mandated requirements, which were in place on April 9-10, 2020, when the present data were 
collected (see Table 2). Items were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (completely 
disregarded) to 7 (completely adhered to). The factorial validity and internal consistency of 
this novel instrument is reported in the Results.  
2.2.5. Demographics. Participants were asked to provide information about their 
gender identity, age, relationship status, ethnicity (based on categories from the last United 
Kingdom census), and educational attainment. We also asked participants who they were 
residing with during the current social-distancing period (1 = No one/single occupant, 2 = 
Partner, 3 = Partner and children, 4 = Family/parents/guardians/siblings, 5 = 
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Friends/housemates, 6 = Other), whether they had been tested and diagnosed with COVID-
19 (1 = No, 2 = Yes), and whether they knew anyone who had been tested and diagnosed with 
COVID-19 (1 = No, 2 = Yes, 3 = Not sure).  
2.3. Procedures 
Our project was approved by the School research ethics panel at Anglia Ruskin 
University. All data were collected via the Prolific website, a crowdsourcing Internet 
marketplace that allows individuals to complete academic surveys for monetary 
compensation, on April 9-10, 2020. The project was advertised as a study on “behaviours and 
attitudes during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic” to mask the study’s hypotheses and 
included an estimated duration (12 minutes). Cross-stratified quota sampling was used to 
obtain a nationally representative sample of the adult (> 18 years) United Kingdom 
population based on gender identity, age, and ethnicity profiles at the last census. Prolific ID 
codes and IP addresses were examined to eliminate participants who took the survey more 
than once and who took a disproportionate amount of time to complete the survey. After 
providing digital informed consent, participants were directed to the scales described above, 
which were presented in a counter-balanced order in QualtricsTM (www.qualtrics.com). 
Demographic items were completed last. The questionnaire was anonymous and, in exchange 
for completion, participants were paid £1.50. All participants received debriefing information 
at the end of the survey. Our data are available in Open Science Framework at 
http://doi.org/osf.io/8f72d. 
3. Results 
3.1. Factor Analyses 
 3.1.1. Factor analytic strategy. To examine the factor structure of responses to our 
two novel measures, we subjected the data to principal-axis exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
in IBM SPSS Statistics v.24. The sample size met requirements for EFA based on item 
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communalities (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006), as well as assumptions for EFA based on 
item distributions, average item correlations, and item-total correlations (Clark & Watson, 
1995). Data factorability was assessed using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy (which should ideally be > .80) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (which 
should be significant). Following Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) recommendation, we 
applied a promax rotation, an oblique rotation method that assumes any emergent factors will 
be correlated. Factor extraction was based on the results of parallel analysis (Hayton et al., 
2004), which reduces the likelihood of factor over-retention compared to other commonly-
used extraction methods (Velicer et al., 2000). Parallel analysis works by creating a random 
dataset with the same number of cases and variables as the actual dataset. Factors in the 
actual data are only retained if their eigenvalues are greater than the eigenvalues from the 
random data (Hayton et al., 2004). Item retention was based on Comrey and Lee’s (1992) 
recommendation that items with “fair” loadings (i.e., ≥ .33) should be retained. 
3.1.2. Rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories. The KMO measure of sampling 
adequacy (KMO = .95) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(153) = 5965.89, p < .001, both 
indicated that these data were factorable. The results of the EFA revealed two factors with λ 
> 1.0, though inspection of the scree plot suggested a single primary factor with a steep cut-
off to a secondary factor. In addition, parallel analysis indicated that only a single factor 
should be extracted: only the first factor from the actual data had λ greater than the criterion λ 
generated from the random data (i.e., 9.26 [actual data] compared to 7.53 [random data]). The 
second factor derived from the actual data had an λ that was lower than the corresponding 
criterion λ generated from the random data (i.e., 1.48 [actual data] compared to 1.99 [random 
data]). As such, we retained a single factor, which explained 51.2% of the common variance. 
As reported in Table 1, all but one item (“Some people are spreading conspiracy theories for 
political or financial gain”) had factor loadings that were minimally fair by Comrey and 
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Lee’s (1992) standards. We, therefore, computed a total score by taking the mean of the 
remaining 17 items. Omega for this total score was .94 (95% CI = .93, .95).  
3.1.3. Compliance with mandated requirements. The KMO measure of sampling 
adequacy (KMO = .78) was slightly below adequacy, but Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(153) 
= 520.83, p < .001, was significant, so we proceeded with the factor analysis. The results 
revealed a single factor with λ = 2.63, explaining 58.6% of the common variance. All four 
items loaded onto this factor (see Table 2), so we computed a total score by taking the mean 
of all items. Internal consistency for scores on this measure was adequate, with ω = .78 (95% 
CI = .75, .81). 
3.2. Mediation Analysis 
 Bivariate correlations between analytic thinking, rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy 
theories/theorists, and compliance with mandated requirements are reported in Table 3. Given 
the observed statistically significant relationships between these variables, we used the 
PROCESS for IBM SPSS Statistics macro developed by Hayes (2018) to test the 
hypothesised mediation model. The bootstrap procedure embedded in the macro was used, 
drawing on 5,000 bootstrap samples from the dataset. Both direct and indirect effects were 
estimated, with the latter considered statistically significant at the .05 level of the 95% CI 
when the CI does not include zero. Using compliance with mandated requirements as the 
outcome variable, rational thinking style showed a significant indirect effect through 
rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists, B = .051, SE = .015, 95% CI (.024, 
.083). The direct effect of rational thinking style on compliance in this model was significant 
t(517) = 6.24, B = .256, SE = .033, p < .001, 95% CI (.140, .267). Likewise, the direct effect 
of rational thinking style on rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists was 
significant, t(518) = 4.46, B = .192, SE = .068, p < .001, 95% CI (.170, .438), as was the 
direct effect of rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists on compliance, t(517) = 
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6.41, B = .263, SE = .021, p < .001, 95% CI (.092, .172). Unstandardised path coefficients are 
included in Figure 1. In addition, the model remained stable and all paths were significant 
when we included education, gender identity, and age as covariates1. 
4. Discussion 
 In the present study, we hypothesised that rational thinking style would be directly 
associated with greater compliance with mandated requirements that were in place in the 
United Kingdom in early April 2020, as well as indirectly via the rejection of COVID-19 
conspiracy theories/theorists. The results of our mediation analysis supported our hypotheses: 
in a sample of adults in the United Kingdom, we found evidence of significant direct and 
indirect associations between rational thinking style and compliance. Put differently, our 
results suggest that individuals who, in the parlance of dual-process theory (e.g., Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Evans & Stanovich, 2013), utilise System 2 processes to a greater extent – 
characterised by deliberative, cognitively-demanding, and slow cognitive styles – were more 
likely to comply with mandated requirements. Additionally, they were also more likely to 
reject COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists, which in turn was associated with greater 
compliance.  
 Our finding of a significant positive association between rational thinking style and 
compliance mandated requirements is consistent with the findings of two previous studies, 
where analytic thinking – as measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test – was associated 
with greater propensity to socially-distance and hand-wash (Stanley et al., 2021; Teovanović 
et al., 2021). Our hypothesising in this regard was broadly derived from expectancy-value 
approaches to health behaviours (e.g., Azjen, 1991, 1999), which suggest that health-related 
intentions and actions are typically the result of rational decision-making processes. More 
specifically, we suggest that a tendency to adopt a rational thinking style may focus attention 
on the risks of COVID-19 and the benefits of complying with mandated requirements not just 
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for the self, but possibly also for close others and the wider the community. Indeed, there is 
some evidence that COVID-19 risk perception was significantly associated with greater 
compliance with social-distancing measures in adults (Wise et al., 2020) and adolescents 
(Oosterhoff & Palmer, 2020), and it is possible that rational thinking style may facilitate 
greater and more accurate assessments of risk probability (e.g., see Leikas et al., 2007). 
Individuals who adopt a rational thinking style may also have a greater sense of familiarity 
with scientific-medical consensus (Plohl & Musil, 2020), better ability to detect 
misinformation (Pennycook & Rand, 2020), and are possibly more altruistic (Arechar et al., 
2017), all of which likely promotes greater compliance with mandated requirements. 
 Beyond the direct association, our results also indicated that rational thinking style 
was indirectly associated with compliance via rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories 
and negative perceptions of conspiracy theorists. The first part of this mediated pathway is 
consistent with previous work indicating that analytic thinking is significantly associated with 
lower belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories (Čavojová et al., 2021) and that a rational 
thinking style is associated with lower belief in conspiracy theories more generally (Barron et 
al., 2018; Swami et al., 2014; van Prooijen, 2017). For example, previous experimental work 
has shown that it may be possible to reduce belief in conspiracy theories by priming 
analytic/rational thinking (Swami et al., 2014). However, one difference between our work 
and that of previous studies is the fact that we focused not on low belief in conspiracy 
theories, but rather a more active rejection in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and/or 
conspiracy theorists. That is, our results suggest that the deliberation, contemplation, and 
premeditation involved in a rational thinking style may provide individuals with the cognitive 
tools to adopt a more critical stance toward both COVID-19 conspiracy theories and develop 
more negative attitudinal stances toward conspiracy theorists. 
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 In turn, rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories/theorists was both directly 
associated with compliance and also mediated the association between rational thinking style 
and compliance. In a very general sense, these findings can be considered to be analogous to 
studies showing that stronger belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories is associated with 
reduced compliance with mandated requirements (e.g., Bierwiaczonek et al., 2020; Fazio et 
al., 2021; Freeman et al., 2021; Rieger, 2020; see also Biddletone et al., 2020). The novelty 
of our work, however, lies in our measurement of COVID-19 conspiracism: rather than 
conceptualising belief along a continuum of strength (i.e., passive disbelief to endorsement), 
our approach was based on more active rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories and those 
who espouse such theories. This resulted in the construction of a unidimensional scale that 
measured explicit rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, negative attitudinal and 
affective responses toward people who spread such conspiracy theories, beliefs that such 
conspiracy theories have negative consequences, and support for efforts to minimise 
exposure to such conspiracy theories. Thus, it may be that the conceptualisation of active 
rejection of conspiracy theories/theorists offers a complementary approach for examining the 
outcomes of conspiracy theories.  
 Two other findings from the present study are worth highlighting. First, it was notable 
that mean responses on the measure of compliance with mandated requirements at the time 
this study was conducted was very high. This is consistent with reports of high rates of 
compliance with social-distancing mandates in other European nations (e.g., Briscese et al., 
2020), although it should be noted that our results are time-limited (i.e., they do not say 
anything about how compliance may or may not change over time). Second, our results were 
robust even after controlling for key participant demographics, namely gender identity, age, 
and education. Controlling for the latter variable may be particularly important given 
previous research suggesting people with higher education are less likely to believe in 
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conspiracy theories (see van Prooijen, 2017). Importantly, however, we did not measure and 
control for cognitive ability, which is notable given that cognitive ability is associated with 
both the tendency to adopt a rational thinking style and to think analytically (see Pennycook 
& Ross, 2016) and belief in conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011). Indeed, research by 
Ståhl and van Prooijen (2018) has suggested that the link between analytic thinking and 
scepticism toward unfounded beliefs may be underpinned by cognitive ability.  
 Certainly, future research would benefit from extending our results by including 
measures of cognitive ability, although it should be noted that reported associations with 
belief in conspiracy theories have sometimes been weak (e.g., Stieger et al., 2013). Future 
work would also benefit from including a wider array of factors that may be associated with 
either belief in, or rejection of, COVID-19 conspiracy theories. For example, emerging 
research has suggested that greater anxiety and perceived lack of control were significantly 
associated with belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories in an online sample of Slovak adults 
(Šrol et al., 2020). It may also be useful to include measures of other relevant psychological 
constructs, such as perceived risk (see Dunning & Pownall, 2020) and support for 
governmental responses to pandemic crises (e.g., Conway et al., 2020), to better account for 
some of our hypothesising. Of course, it should also be noted that the present research was 
centrally focused psychological factors that are associated with compliance, but individual 
ability and willingness to comply with social-distancing measures are also likely to be 
affected by economic, socio-political, and temporal factors (e.g., Atchinson et al., 2020; 
Zhang et al., 2020).  
In terms of the latter, it is worth repeating that our findings may be limited to a 
particular time-point in the containment phase of the United Kingdom’s strategy for stopping 
the spread of COVID-19 and thus may have limited generalisability during other phases or to 
other nations. Also of note, the cross-sectional nature of data means that causational 
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conclusions should be drawn with extreme caution. While we have interpreted our results in 
line with extant theorising, it is also possible that bidirectional links exist (e.g., between 
rational thinking style and rejection of conspiracy theories/theorists). Finally, while we have 
no reason to believe that our measure of active rejectionism of COVID-19 conspiracy 
theories/theorists lacks validity (e.g., given the significant association with analytic thinking), 
it would be useful in future research to assess construct validity more fully. This could be 
achieved, for example, by examining associations between scores on our novel measure and 
scores on generic measures of belief in conspiracy theories (for a review of relevant 
measures, see Swami et al., 2017). Doing so may be particularly important given that our 
novel measure, although unidimensional, measures a number of different elements that we 
globally consider to be reflective of rejectionism.  
 These limitations notwithstanding, the present results suggest that individual 
differences in the disposition to think rationally may help shape compliance with mandates to 
stop the spread of COVID-19 both directly and via rejection of conspiracy theories/theorists. 
Although the question of what promotes analytic/rational thinking has been discussed widely 
in the past decade (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Pennycook et al., 2015), there remains a 
need to better understand how the promotion of analytic/rational thinking can be best 
achieved outside the laboratory. This question takes on added urgency under conditions of 
mandated social-distancing, where novel communication strategies will be required and when 
individual voluntarism to engage with interventions may be important. Aside from such 
methods, it will also be important to provide citizens with the tools to more effectively and 
efficiently combat the spread of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, such as by nudging citizens 
toward trusted sources of information (Gostin et al., 2020; Wiederhold, 2020) or regulating 
available health information (Cuan-Baltazar et al., 2020). Doing so may be important not 
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only to motivate greater compliance with mandated requirements, but also to prevent 
negative outcomes of conspiracy theorising during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Footnotes 
1When education, gender identity, and age were included as covariates, analytic thinking 
exerted a significant indirect effect on compliance via rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy 
theories, B = .046, SE = .014, 95% CI (.019, .075). The direct effect of analytic thinking on 
compliance with mandated requirements was significant t(514) = 7.12, B = .283, SE = .032, p 
< .001, 95% CI (.162, .286), as was the direct effect of analytic thinking on rejection of 
COVID-19 conspiracy theories, t(515) = 4.31, B = .188, SE = .069, p < .001, 95% CI (.162, 
.433) and the direct effect of rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories on compliance, 
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Item-Level Descriptive Statistics and Item-Factor Loadings for the Novel Measure of 
Rejection of COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories. 
Item M SD Factor 
loading 
People who believe conspiracy theories about the epidemic 
are misguided. 
5.48 1.54 .85 
Conspiracy theories about the epidemic only causing 
confusion and uncertainty. 
5.88 1.44 .82 
The sharing of conspiracy theories at this time is 
irresponsible. 
5.44 1.56 .81 
I do not believe any of the conspiracy theories of the 
epidemic that I have come across. 
5.48 1.69 .81 
This is not the time to be engaging in conspiracy theories 
about the epidemic. 
5.69 1.52 .79 
I think conspiracy theories about the epidemic have some 
truth to them (R) 
2.88 1.66 -.77 
Conspiracy theories about the epidemic usually do not 
make much sense. 
4.97 1.61 .72 
I feel angry when I see people sharing conspiracy theories 
about the epidemic. 
4.68 1.75 .72 
People who share conspiracy theories about the epidemic 
are untrustworthy. 
4.72 1.62 .71 
COVID-19 30 
The authorities should do more to clamp down on people 
who share conspiracy theories about the epidemic. 
4.52 1.64 .68 
Conspiracy theories about the epidemic are a cause for 
concern. 
5.30 1.44 .64 
People who share conspiracy theories about the epidemic 
are acting selfishly. 
4.57 1.64 .63 
People or organisations who share conspiracy theories 
about the epidemic should be punished in some way. 
4.13 1.72 .61 
I find it disgusting that some people believe conspiracy 
theories about the epidemic. 
3.97 1.74 .58 
Conspiracy theories about the epidemic are endangering 
lives. 
5.14 1.62 .55 
Conspiracy theories about the epidemic are making it 
difficult to stop the spread of the coronavirus. 
4.09 1.73 .41 
Conspiracy theories about the epidemic are a cause of 
public disorder. 
4.22 1.63 .39 
Some people are spreading conspiracy theories for political 
or financial gain. 
4.99 1.48 .28 
 
Note. (R) denotes an item that was reverse-coded. Items in bold are items that loaded onto the 






Item-Level Descriptive Statistics and Item-Factor Loadings for the Novel Measure of 
Compliance with Mandated Requirements (as of April 9, 2020). 
Item M SD Factor 
loading 
Only going outside for food, health reasons, or work (only 
if you cannot work from home). 
6.65 0.68 .82 
Staying 2 metres (6 feet) away from other people when you 
have to go out. 
6.42 0.78 .79 
Washing your hands regularly and as soon as you return 
home. 
6.55 0.73 .74 
Not meeting other people, including family and friends, 
you do not share a home with.   





Descriptive Statistics Bivariate Correlations between All Variables Included in the Present 
Study. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Compliance with mandated requirements  .31** .31** 
(2) Rejection of COVID-19 conspiracy theories   .19** 
(3) Analytic thinking    
M 6.56 4.90 3.71 
SD 0.59 1.17 0.74 
 






Graphical Representation of the Hypothesised Relationships, Along with Results of the 
Mediation Analysis (Unstandardised Coefficients between the Variables); All ps < .001 and 
the Asterisk Denotes an Indirect Effect. 
 
